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INTRODUCTION

Generally, estate planners are a cautious and conservative group
that tend to utilize well-established estate planning devices which offer
little or no exposure to challenge by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). Perhaps no aspect of estate planning has been the subject of as
many recent controversial tax rulings, court decisions and legal commentaries as has life insurance. One of the most significant areas of
current concern has been the payment of life insurance premiums by
an insured after he has transferred all the incidents of ownership in the
policy. This area possesses such a large amount of uncertainty that
many estate planners now avoid transfers of life insurance policies in
their estate plans for their clients.
Section 2035(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides that
there be included in a decedent's gross estate, the value of any interest
in property transferred by him within three years of his date of death
and in contemplation thereof (except in the case of a bona fide sale for
an adequate and full consideration in cash or other property).' The
contemplation-of-death inquiry is limited in that any "interest" transferred by a decedent more than three years prior to his death is
conclusively presumed not to be a contemplation-of-death transfer.
Where an interest is transferred within three years of death a
contemplation-of-death assertion by the IRS creates a rebuttable presumption which places the burden of proof on the personal representatives of the decedent's estate. However the fact patterns in life insurance transfers have greatly strengthened the Commissioner's
2
presumption .
Even though each branch of the federal government, numerous
commentators and other authorities have attempted to establish
* J.D. University of Florida; LL. M. New York University; Associated with Greenberg,
Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff & Quentel, P.A., Miami, Florida.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.

2. See Quiggle, Recent Developments in Contemplation of Death, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON
FED. TAx. 1047 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Quiggle]. See also H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. B14-15 (1954).
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guidelines to classify a true contemplation-of-death transfer, the final
analysis requires an examination of the marshalled facts on a case by
case basis. The scope of this article will not encompass the courts'
examination of the pertinent factors in all contemplation-of-death decisions; the focus instead will be limited to one type of "interest"-life
insurance-and to the characterization of premium payments by a
decedent within three years of his death as a "transfer."
II.

CONTEMPLATION-OF-DEATH

IN LIFE INSURANCE

Although the Internal Revenue Service has achieved only limited
success in contemplation-of-death cases, 3 it has achieved a substantial
victory percentage in contemplation-of-death cases involving gifts of
insurance policies. 4 Code section 2035 does not refer to the general
expectation of death entertained by all persons, nor does it cover only
those cases involving an apprehension that death is imminent or near.'
The current test involves both the donor's motive in making the gift
and his thought of death as a controlling factor in establishing this
motive. Since the dominant purpose of the statute is to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions, a transfer for the purpose of avoiding death taxes or as a substitute testamentary disposition tends to be a
6
transfer prompted by the requisite thought of death.
The death-related qualities of life insurance have prompted the
IRS to consider any gifts of life insurance by a donor within three
years of his death as being in contemplation-of-death. 7 While the
judiciary traditionally has not sustained the IRS' overreaching position, recent decisions demonstrate the greater burden of persuasion
placed upon the legal representatives of a decedent's 8estate for life
insurance gifts versus gifts of other types of property.
Life insurance is an asset that may have little or no value during
life but obtains substantial value on death. Because an individual must
wait until death to realize its value, life insurance's real economic
significance is integrally related to, and dependent upon, the insured's
'death. The promotion of life insurance is often related to giving the
insured's family increased asset liquidity or to enable the family to
receive funds to compensate for the loss of the insured's earning
capacity on his death. These factors make proof of life motives in life
insurance transfers very difficult.
While taxpayers have recognized some success in contemplationof-death cases involving life insurance transfers, the large number of
3. Quiggle, supra note 2.
4. See the cases discussed in Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
5. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
6. See Estate of Morris R. Silverman, 61 T.C. No. 37 (Dec. 6, 1973).
7. Berall, Use of Life Insurance in Estate Planning-Recent Developments, N.Y.U. 31ST
INST. ON FED. TAx. 1053, 1079 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Berall].

8. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970); Kahn v.
United States, 349 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See Shelnut, Estate Taxation of Insurance
Policies Transferred in Contemplation of Death, 46 FLA. B.J. 674 (1972).
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IRS victories have resulted largely from the lack of documentation of
life motives in such gifts.
III.

CONTEMPLATION-OF-DEATH AND THE PAYMENT OF
INSURANCE PREMIUMS

Recent developments in the contemplation-of-death gifts of life
insurance controversy have been primarily concerned with the amount
of insurance to be included in the decedent-insured's gross estate rather
than with the determination of whether a contemplation of death
transfer had been made. This situation involves a decedent paying, in
contemplation-of-death, the premiums on a policy on his life, which he
either never owned, 9 or, if he did, which he transferred more than
three years prior to his death.' 0 The question, in essence, is what
portion of the proceeds, if any, would be drawn back into the
decedent-insured's gross estate as a result of his contemplation-of-death
premium payments. While the answer to this question may be dependent upon the type of policy transferred, there are generally four
possible alternatives:
(1) Inclusion of the contemplation-of-death premiums in the
decedent-insured's gross estate;
(2) Inclusion of the allocable portion of the proceeds attributable to the premium payments paid in contemplation-ofdeath;
(3) No inclusion for either the premium payments or the
insurance proceeds; or
(4) Inclusion of the entire proceeds in the decedent-insured's
gross estate.
IV.

PREMIUM PAYMENTS-RETURN

TO UNCERTAINTY

Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, life insurance proceeds
were includable in a decedent-insured's gross estate where:"
(1) The decedent-insured's estate was the named beneficiary
of the policy;
(2) The insured possessed certain incidents of ownership over
the policy; or
(3) The insured, either directly or indirectly, paid the premiums on a policy on his life or the owner of the policy
was the named beneficiary of said policy.
In drafting section 2042 of the 1954 Code, Congress specifically
rejected the third situation as an "incident of ownership" for inclusion
of the proceeds of a policy in the estate of the insured. 12 The scope of
9. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971).
10. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 329.
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122, as amended by Act of Oct. 21,
1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 944.
12. Hearings on the Subject of General Revenue Revision Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1582 (1953).
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this congressional action was restricted, however, to the operative
predecessor of this Code section. The effect of the repeal of the
"premium-payment" test on situations arising under section 2042 became clear; that Code section was only applicable to situations in
which the insured possessed incidents of ownership or where the
proceeds of a policy were payable to an insured's estate. While Congress eliminated the premium-payment test for Code section 2042, this
legislative body did not specifically repeal this test for other estate tax
provisions which could apply to a life insurance situation. It was,
therefore, arguable that the premium-payment test was still "alive" for
any other estate tax provisions, specifically section 2035.
Even though the IRS asserted the applicability of the premiumpayment test in estate tax cases at its District and Appellate Conferee
levels, 3 the government did not announce its official position until
1967.14 This official position was predicated upon the view that life
insurance premiums and proceeds were integrally and inextricably
related. Revenue Ruling 67-463 dealt with two situations:
(1) An insured transferred a policy on his life more than three
years prior to his death but continued to pay the premiums
until his death; and
(2) The decedent-insured's wife was the original applicant for the
policy, but the insured made all premium payments until his
death.
In both situations, the IRS concluded that a section 2035 "transfer" of an "interest" in the policy had occurred. This interest was
measured by the proportion that the amount of the premiums paid by
the insured bore to the total amount of the premiums paid. Moreover,
the Ruling stated that under section 2035 the application for the
insurance policy by another had no effect on the inclusion of the
proportionate part of the proceeds in the decedent-insured's gross
estate.
The basis of the IRS' position was the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the term "transfer" in Chase National Bank v.
United States. 15 In that case, the Court concluded that the word
"transfer" could not be interpreted in a restricted sense as referring
13. Berall, supra note 7, at 1081.
14. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 327.
15. 278 U.S. 327 (1929). The Court stated:
Obviously, the word "transfer" in the statute, or the privilege which may constitution-

ally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of
particular items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee. It must, we
think, at least include the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the
decedent with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another. Sec. 402
(c) taxes transfers made in contemplation of death. It would not, we assume, be
seriously argued that its provisions could be evaded by the purchase by a decedent from
a third person of property, a savings bank book for example, and its delivery by the
seller directly to the intended beneficiary on the purchaser's death, or that the measure
of the tax would be the cost and not the value or proceeds at the time of death.
Id.

at 337.

1974]
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only to items passing directly from the decedent to the transferee. 16
The Supreme Court held that a "transfer" also included property
procured through expenditures by the decedent with17 the purpose,
effected at his death, of having it passed to another.
Thus, a premium paid by the insured in contemplation of his
death, would, in the Commissioner's view, result in the inclusion in
the decedent-insured's gross estate of a proportionate part of the proceeds of the policy. This proportion would be determined by multiplying the proceeds by a fraction, the numerator of which would be the
contemplation-of-death premiums and the denominator of which
would be the total of all the premiums paid. The commentators
immediately criticized the Ruling as ignoring the legislative history
regarding the elimination of the premium-payment test from section
2042, disregarding the rights of the policy owner, overlooking the
actuary reality of life insurance, failing to consider the application of
the non-forfeiture values and not being supportable by the judicial
decisions upon which the Ruling was based.' 8
The judicial response to the IRS' position announced in the Revenue Ruling was immediate, hostile opposition. In Gorman v. United
States, '9the decedent arranged for a five-year renewable, convertible
term policy to be issued to his wife. The policy was issued to the wife
and was owned by her at all times. The decedent made the first
premium payment and passed away nine months later. Relying on
Revenue Ruling 67-463 and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
"transfer, ' 20 the Commissioner sought to include the policy's $50,000
proceeds in the decedent's gross estate. The court rejected this argument as being an administrative attempt to adopt the premiumpayment test which had been eliminated by the enactment of the 1954
Code. 2' After determining that section 2035 was an asset transfer
section, the court found that the only "specific asset" transferred was
the value of the premiums. The amount included in the decedent's
gross estate, therefore, was the amount
equal to the premiums the
22
decedent had paid on the policy.
Shortly after this "defeat" in the Gorman case, the Commissioner
lost a Tax Court case which paralleled situation (2) in Revenue Ruling
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. See, e.g., Simmons, Contemplation of Death Aspects of Life Insurance, U. MIAMI INST.
OF EST. PLAN. %68.110 (1968). While the IRS' position differed somewhat from the eliminated

premium-payment test in that the Ruling analyzed what the insured's payment actually acquired,
almost all the judicial decisions construing the Ruling have either criticized, distinguished or
invalidated the Ruling as being an attempted resurrection of the premium-payment test. See
Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Estate of Inez Coleman, 52 T.C.
921, 923 (1969).
19. 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich 1968) [hereinafter referred to as Gorman].

20. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
21. 288 F. Supp. at 230.
22. Id. at 234.
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67-463. In the Estate of Inez Coleman, 23 the decedent-insured had her
children apply for a life insurance policy within three years prior to her
death. While the decedent never possessed or transferred any of the
incidents of ownership, she paid all the premiums on the policy. The
taxpayer and the government stipulated that approximately fifty percent of the premiums paid on the policy were in contemplation-ofdeath. The government attempted to include approximately one-half
of the policy's proceeds in the decedent's gross estate. The taxpayer
argued that only the premiums paid in contemplation-of-death should
be included. The basis of the court's decision was its determination of
what constituted the "transferred property interest." Legislative history, the court noted, revealed that the "payment of premiums [would]
no longer [be] a factor in determining the taxability under this section
of insurance proceeds." 24 The court concluded that the words "under
this section" were limited to the application of section 2042 and not to
any other Code provision-in this case, section 2035. In analyzing the
"transfer" requirements of section 2035, the court looked to what the
decedent had parted with as a result of her payment of the premiums
in contemplation-of-death. The court determined that the decedent
had no interest in the policy or its proceeds and, therefore, could not
have made a constructive transfer of an interest in the policy. As in the
Gorman decision, the only amount included in the decedent's estate
25
was the value of the premiums paid in contemplation-of-death.
While the Coleman court attempted to limit the repeal of the
premium payment test to section 2042, its decision under section 2035
was clearly influenced by the repeal of said test. Prior to the court's
analysis of certain elements of section 2035, the court discredited any
attempt to allow the premium payment test to "rise phoenixlike" from
its ashes. 2 6 Although a substantial and articulate dissent was registered
by four judges, 27 the Coleman court reaffirmed the rationale of the
Gorman decision by stating that the "frontiers of section 2035 should
not be extended to include the proceeds of life insurance simply be'28
cause a decedent paid the premiums.
The Internal Revenue Service found short-lived success for its
position in a Texas Federal District Court's decision. In First National
Bank v. United States, 29 the decedent's two daughters applied for life
insurance on the decedent's life in 1953, and the decedent paid all
premiums on each policy until his death in 1961. Citing only Revenue
Ruling 67-463 to justify its holding, the district court upheld the IRS'
23.
24.
25.
26.

52 T.C. 921 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Coleman].
Id. at 922 (emphasis added).
Id. at 924.
Id. at 923.

27. Judges Tietjens, Raum and Dawson each rendered a dissenting opinion with Judge
Simpson agreeing to the reasoning in all three dissents. Id. at 926-28.
28. Id. at 924.
29. 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas.

12,574 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
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inclusion of a proportionate portion of the insurance proceeds attributable to premium payments paid in contemplation-of-death. 3 0 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in reversing the district court's
decision, struck down the government's attempt to equate a decedent
paying premiums on a policy owned by another with a person who
physically transfers the policy. 3 1 In addition, Revenue Ruling 67-463
since it was not supportable by statute or
was found to be invalid
32
judicial authority.
V.

REVENUE RULING 71-497-A CHANGE IN THE
IRS POSITION

Confronted with universal judicial rejection of its position, the
IRS reconsidered and revoked Revenue Ruling 67-463. Revenue Ruling 71-49733 announced that the IRS would now follow the First
National Bank decision and would no longer apply the principles of
Revenue Ruling 67-463 in the following situations:
Policy Purchased Prior to Three-Year Period. In one factual
situation of Revenue Ruling 71-497, four years prior to his death, a
decedent purchased and transferred to his wife all incidents of ownership of both a whole life and a five-year term policy on his life. The
decedent-insured continued to pay the premiums on both policies.
Following the First National Bank rationale, The IRS ruled that no
part of the proceeds were includable in the decedent's gross estate. The
only amount taxed was the value of the premiums paid by decedent
during the three-year contemplation-of-death period.
Policy Purchased Within Three-Year Period. Situation two involved a one-year term, accidental death policy purchased nine
months prior to the insured's accidental death. While his children were
the owners and beneficiaries of the policy, the decedent paid all the
premiums. The IRS held that this was a transfer of the policy to
decedent's children which would cause the entire amount of the proceeds to be included in the decedent's gross estate. After discussing the
30. Id.
31. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970) [hereinafter referred to

as First National Bank].
We cannot agree that any bundle of rights was transferred. As already pointed out, the
right to collect the proceeds of the policies had existed from the inception of the policies.
The daughters could have paid the premiums themselves; they were under no duty to
allow someone else to pay them.
Id. at 1288.
32. It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit's opinion struck down the Revenue Ruling by
finding that the Supreme Court's opinion in the Chase case was, inapplicable to insurance
proceeds in contemplation-of-death controversies. The court noted that the Chase case should be
limited to the classification of the federal estate tax as a "direct tax" on insurance proceeds. The
interesting aspect of this limitation on the Chase rationale is striking in light of the Fifth Circuit's
reliance on this Supreme Court case two years later in Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th
Cir. 1971).
33. 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 329. See Eliasberg, Contemplation of Death and Estate Taxation of
Life Insurance, 111 TRUSTS & ESTATES 690 (1972); Rhodes, Contemplation of Death-The
Problem of Life Insurance Premiums, 24 TAx LAW 589 (1971).
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Supreme Court's holding concerning indirect transfers and the application of section 2035, the Internal Revenue Service supported the
rationale for the inclusion for the entire proceeds generated by the
accidental death policy as follows:
Thus, in Situation 2, the economic benefit that the decedent did in substance transfer to his children by the purchase
of the insurance policy was not the use of the cash amount of
the premium payment, but the right to the insurance coverage for the one-year period of the contract. This coverage
matured into the proceeds of the policy at his death. Accordingly, it is held that the value of the insurance in this situation is includible in his gross estate under Section 2035
of the
34
Code. See Section 2042-1(a)(2) of the regulations.
In essence, Revenue Ruling 71-497 extensively modified the position
announced in Revenue Ruling 67-463. The new Revenue Ruling,
however, did not concern itself with those situations in which the
policy transfer took place less than three years before the
decedent-insured's death or in situations where the premium-paying
insured, non-owner died within three years of the purchase of the
policy by another.
VI. The Bel Case-A SUBSTANTIAL IRS VICTORY
In an apparent, cogent appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit to reverse a 1970 taxpayer victory in the federal district
court, Revenue Ruling 71-497, focused upon the inclusion of the entire
proceeds of a one-year accidental policy in a decedent-insured's estate
if the decedent had paid the premiums. This situation delineated in the
Revenue Ruling encompassed the exact fact situation found in Bel v.
United States. " In Bel, the decedent-insured purchased a renewable
$250,000 accidental death policy. While the decedent executed the
original insurance application and paid all the premiums, the policies
from their inception were owned solely by the decedent's three children. Since the policies had to be renewed annually by the decedent,
he was forced to make a premium payment in contemplation of his
death.
The federal district court held for the taxpayer by looking to the
legislative history of section 2042 and to the prior judicial decisions
refusing to extend the premium payment test to a section 2035
situation. 36 Furthermore, the lower court reiterated the Tax Court's
reasoning in the Coleman decision and held that the only amount that
34. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 330.
35. 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Bel]. For excellent analyses of the

Bel decision, see Rosenberg, Section 2035-Premium Payments Made in Contemplation of
Death, 51 TAXEs 468 (1973); Walker, Contemplation-of-Death in Payment of Life Insurance
Premiums: Where Do We Now Stand?, 39 J. TAx. 348 (1973).
36. Bel v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. La. 1970).
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could be included in the decedent's gross estate
was the value of the
7
premium paid in contemplation-of-death.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the lower court's reasoning by properly
noting that the lower court misapplied the legislative history concerning section 2042.38 In addition, the court found the Bel factual situation different from the Coleman case in that Coleman involved a
transfer of a policy more than three years prior to a decedent's death.
In Bel, however, the court found that the
Premium paid by the decedent less than one year prior to his
death engendered the entire right, title, and interest, which
the decedent's children had in the accidental death policy.
Essentially, every stick in the bundle of rights constituting
the policy and its proceeds
had its genesis within three years
39
of the decedent's death.

The court then took an expansive view of the word "transfer." The
court held that the scope of the judicial inquiry should not focus upon
what the decedent "parted with" or "diverted from his estate" as a
result of his purchase of the accidental death policy in contemplationof-death. Although Coleman and the lower court decision in Bel
adopted this "diversion" principle, the Fifth Circuit chose to analyze
the Supreme Court's interpretation of "transfer" in the Chase case.
Moreover, the restrictive interpretation of "transfer" given by the
Gorman court was criticized as an impermissible subversion of the
underlying purpose of section 2035.40
Both the Bel decision and Revenue Ruling 71-497 (situation no.
2), by including in a decedent's gross estate the proceeds purchased
from premiums paid in contemplation-of-death, appear to be limited to
policies taken out within three years of a decedent's death. The interesting aspects of the Revenue Ruling and the Bel case are: (1) the
rejection of the "diversion" principle espoused in the Gorman case; (2)
the reintroduction of the expansive interpretation of "transfer"; and (3)
the assertion that sections 2042 and 2035 are not to be read in pari
materia.
37. Id. at 1194-95.

38. 452 F.2d at 690. The court noted that the application of the legislative history for section
2042 to section 2035 was similar to applying a provision concerning lemons to another provision
dealing with oranges. The court asserted that sections 2042 and 2035 "came into being at
different times," were aimed at diverse "respective targets" and had "no philosophic confluence to
twin them." Id. at 690.
39. Id. at 690.
40. Id. at 690-91. Although Judges Dyer and Coleman composed two of the three judges
deciding both the First National Bank and the Bel case, there are numerous differences in the
principles espoused. The Bel court distinguished its 1970 decision by delineating the fact that in
that case the insurance policy had been procured more than three years prior to the decedent's
death. In Bel, the policy was acquired one year prior to the insured's death. The Bel court,
however, did reverse its earlier construction of the meaning of the Chase decision which it had

announced in its First National Bank case.
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Bel
Armed with a significant victory in the Bel decision, the Commissioner, in Kahn v. United States, 4 ' argued that the purchase and
transfer of an accidental death policy within three years of death
automatically constituted a transfer in contemplation-of-death within
the meaning of the estate tax provisions. The rationale for this assertion was based upon the nature of accidental death policies in that
these policies provide no benefits until death, have no cash surrender
value, usually cannot be utilized for borrowing purposes, and therefore, should be classified as "testamentary dispositions." The federal
district court, however, refused to accept this view and held that the
contemplation-of-death presumption was rebutted by the taxpayer
through the affirmative presentation of "life" motives supporting the
42
transfer of the property.
In Kahn, the president of a corporation, on the advice of his
insurance agent, purchased group insurance for his corporate employees with the corporation paying for all premiums on the policies.
Among the employees who obtained such insurance coverage were the
son and daughter-in-law of the president of the corporation. This
couple, on their insurance applications, designated the respective
spouse as the owner-beneficiary of the respective group policies. Approximately one year later while the policies were still in effect, the son
and daughter-in-law perished in a fire.
The Kahn court found that there had been a "transfer" since the
husband had a vested interest and owned his certificate of insurance
prior to designating his wife as owner-beneficiary, and that the wife
had a similar interest in her certificate prior to her reciprocal designation. While the court's reasoning seems logical, there is other language
in the opinion which is disturbing. The court held that, while neither
party had procured the certificates nor had they made any premium
payments, each had given consideration for the certificates-the husband through his continuing employment with the corporation and the
wife as the spouse of an eligible employee. This "continuing employment" theory is contrary to the Internal Revenue Service's position
that the power to cancel an insurance policy by termination of employment is not an incident of ownership over the policy for purposes of
inclusion in a decedent's gross estate. 4 3 Thus, the Kahn opinion was
too broad for purposes of determining ownership of a policy prior to its
44
transfer.
The impact of the Bel decision was soon illustrated in cases
decided by two courts of appeal. In Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v.
VII.

JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO

41. 349 F. Supp, 806 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
42. Id.
43. Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 307.
44. It should be noted that the opinion analyzed the life motive of the decedents in their
respective transfers along with their total lack of estate planning to hold that the transfers were
not in contemplation of death.

19741
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United States, 45 the decedent entered into an irrevocable trust agreement with the bank as trustee. The decedent transferred $9,600 to the
trust in order to acquire $100,000 of life insurance payable to the
decedent's children on his death. The trust agreement provided that
the decedent was to continue to make contributions to the trust for the
payment of life insurance premiums, and the trustee was to expend
said funds only for this specific purpose. Although decedent was in
apparent good health when he established the trust, he died approximately six months later.
Relying on the Gorman rationale, the federal district court granted
the decedent's estate a summary judgment and held that only the
$9,600 previously transferred to the trust was includable as a transfer
in contemplation-of-death under section 2035.46 The government appealed and both parties stipulated that the funds transferred by the
decedent to the trust were paid in contemplation-of-death. The
decedent's estate sought to affirm the lower court's decision on the
basis that decedent never owned the insurance policy and, therefore,
could not have transferred it. The government argued that the trustee
was, in essence, the decedent's agent for the purpose of purchasing the
life insurance.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit analyzed the dominant purpose of section 2035 in reaching substitutes for testamentary
dispositions in order to evade estate taxes and held that the trustee, by
acting as the agent for the decedent in purchasing life insurance, was
utilizing a trust device that was a substitute for testamentary
disposition. 4 7 After the court analyzed the Bel opinion and the Supreme Court interpretation of "transfer" outlined in the Chase case, it
suggested that Congress intended to include in the gross estate of a
decedent any gifts of insurance made in contemplation-of-death to be
valued in terms of the transfer of the proceeds at death rather than at
48
the purchase or premium cost.
One week after the Detroit Bank decision, a federal district court,
in First National Bank of Oregon v. United States,4 9 followed the Bel
rationale by holding that a life insurance contract, which was applied
for and owned by the insured's wife, was transferred in contemplation-of-death because all of the premium payments were paid
by the insured. Since the policy was procured by the wife within three
years of her husband's death, the court found that "[t]he purchase of
45. 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Detroit Bank]:
46. Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
47. 467 F.2d at 969. The taxpayer did not seriously dispute the government's argument that
the taxpayer adopted this method of estate planning to decrease federal estate taxes. The court
was influenced from this "evasion of the estate tax" by a substitute testamentary device.
48. Id. On remand, the district court found life motives in setting up the irrevocable trust
and, therefore, reversed the court of appeals' inclusion of the proceeds in the decedent's estate.
Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
49. 352 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Ore. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Bank of Oregon].
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two policies by the decedent in his wife's name cannot be distinguished
from the procurement of the policies in his own name and immediately
transferring all ownership rights to his wife." 50 While this statement
may be supportable under the facts in this specific case, its validity as
a general statement of law is highly questionable. The decedent's
estate based its argument upon the invalidity of this statement of the
lower court by asserting that a "transfer" by the decedent was impossible since he neither procured nor owned the policies.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower
court decision by stating that "where a policy is both procured at the
behest of the decedent within the statutory period and where all the
premiums are paid by the deceased in contemplation-of-death, the gift
must necessarily be one of the property interest in the policy."51 The
court established an "agency-type" basis for including the life insurance proceeds under section 2035. By emphasizing the relevance of the
life insurance being "procured at the behest of the decedent," the court
indicated that funds directly or indirectly provided by the decedentinsured with specific instructions to purchase life insurance from said
funds would require inclusion of the life insurance proceeds in the
decedent's estate. 52 Thus, the often-used method of having a husband
make a gift to his wife or children of sufficient funds to purchase life
insurance on his life would fail under the Bank of Oregon rationale.
While the result in this case could have been avoided if the decedent's
spouse had paid the premiums with her own independent funds, the
consequences of the case are more difficult where the wife or children
have no sources of independent income. It has been suggested that an
unconditional gift of money in an amount different from the premium
obligation with no requirement for the purchase of a life insurance
policy on the insured's life could avoid the problems encountered in the
Detroit Bank and Bank of Oregon decisions.5 3 Future cases analyzing
this alternative will determine its success as an estate planning tool.
In a 1973 decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
reversing a lower court decision, decided a gift in contemplation-ofdeath life insurance situation that may be even more troubling than
5 4
the consequences of the Bel decision. In Berman v. United States,
50. Id. at 1158.
51. First Nat'l Bank of Ore. v. United States, 488 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1973).
52. Id. at 577.
53. The Treasury Department proposed a rule that would treat an insured-decedent as
"constructively" paying the premiums on a policy if he had made cash gifts or loans to the
owner-beneficiary sufficient to pay the premiums during the three years preceding his death. 3
UNITED STATES TREAS. DEPT. TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 375 (Comm. Print 1969).
But see Estate of William C. Chapin, 29 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 11 (1970), where the Tax Court

held for the taxpayer in a situation where a wife, on her husband's advice, applied for a policy on
her husband's life. He paid the first premium and she paid the second premium by "borrowingout" on the policy. The husband died soon thereafter and the court included only the premiums in
his estate even though it found a contemplation-of-death transfer. Id. at 16.
54. 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Berman].
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the insured-decedent obtained an airline life insurance policy at the
airport and immediately assigned the policy to his son before boarding
the airplane. The airplane crashed and the government included the
airline insurance proceeds in the decedent's gross estate. The district
court found that the transfer was not in contemplation-of-death by
finding that insured (1) was in good health; (2) had no pressing problems; (3) had made similar flights in the past; (4) had purchased the
smallest policy available (which represented only a nominal part of his
net worth); and (5) would presumably not have boarded the plane if he
had in fact contemplated death."5
In its reversal, the court of appeals distinguished "contemplation-of-death" from "expectation of death." In essence, the court
found that even though the decedent may not have expected to die, the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he had not contemplated
death.1 6 The court reasoned that the burden was on the estate to prove
that the decedent's assignment of the life insurance policy was primarily motivated by the expectation of continued life. The Berman reasoning arguably converts the "rebuttable presumption" of section 2035
into a conclusive presumption when the property transferred is term
life insurance of a limited duration. The court's rationale places life
insurance in a distinct category of gifts since it is so intertwined with
the effects of death. The solution of a Berman-type situation would be
to have the beneficiary of a flight insurance policy procure and pay for
this type of insurance on the insured's life; however, in this fast-paced,
jet-aged world, such a solution is often impractical.
VIII.

THE PRESENT STATUS

OF THE LAW

The recent decisions by the various courts of appeals and Revenue
Ruling 71-497 must be viewed together in order to properly plan a life
insurance transfer. The following situations seem to provide an overall
analysis of this area of law:
(1) Revenue Ruling 71-497 indicates that if a non-insured owner is
the owner of a policy for more than three years before the insured's
death, irrespective of the manner in which the owner acquired the
policy, the amount includable as a gift in contemplation-of-death is
limited to the premiums paid by the insured within three years of his
death. While this position is both correct and equitable, it lends little
aid to an estate planner since the insured must live at least three years
after the non-insured owner acquires the policy.
(2) If the insured applies for a policy on his life and transfers the
policy within three years of his death, the entire proceeds will be
included in the insured's gross estate.
(3) Where the insured applies for the policy but the policy is issued
to another individual-i.e., the insured's spouse-the Revenue Ruling
55. Berman v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Miss. 1973).
56. 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973).
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and the court decisions indicate that the policy's proceeds will be
includable in the insured's gross estate if he has continued to make all
premium payments. The basis of this holding is the active influence
and control that the insured possesses in the acquisition of the policy
and his continuing participation in keeping the policy in effect.
(4) If a relative applies for a policy on the life of the insured
without the influence of the insured in acquiring the policy, and the
insured agrees to make all premium payments, there may be sufficient
distinctions from this situation to exclude the proceeds from the
decedent's gross estate. 57 The problems involved in this factual pattern
center on the role the insured plays in the administrative events
required in the acquisition of a life insurance policy. Often, an insured
must undergo a medical examination or must satisfy numerous requirements of the life insurance company before a policy will be issued
on his life. This participation may be sufficient to engender the includability of life insurance proceeds via the Bel and Bank of Oregon
doctrines.
(5) The problems involved in the renewal of an annual policy
present an extremely difficult and still unresolved dilemma to the
estate planner. The classification of the renewed policy is the key to
the inclusion or exclusion of the life insurance proceeds from the
decedent's gross estate. Thus, where the insured has transferred an
annual, renewable policy at least three years prior to his death, the
classification of the renewed policy as a continuation of the old policy
should include only the premium payments made by the insured during the three year contemplation-of-death period.5 8 If, however, the
renewed policy is substantially different from the original policy so
that it is classified as a new policy, the premium payments by the
insured would presumably procure a new policy and would cause the
inclusion of the policy's proceeds.
(6) The assignment of flight insurance policies will probably be
included in the decedent's gross estate in an estate tax audit where the
decedent applied for and/or paid the premiums on such a policy and
another individual owned the policy at the time the insured perished in
the plane crash. The Berman decision indicates that the estate will
have a very difficult burden of persuasion to rebut the contemplationof-death presumption. Although it is somewhat impractical, the main
solution to this problem would be to have the beneficiary accompany
the insured to the airport so that the beneficiary can acquire and pay
for the airline insurance policy.
(7) One element that has caused great consternation to estate
planners has been the "tracing" effect of these judicial opinions. The
courts have analyzed the "control beam" or "bundle of rights" that the
57. Compare Estate of Inez Coleman, 52 T.C. 921 (1969), with Bel v. United States, 452
F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971).
58. But see Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971).
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decedent-insured possessed over a policy which he did not own. The
consequences of this language have caused many estate planners to
forego the gifting of premium payment funds from the insured to the
owner of the policy. These estate planners feel that the Internal Revenue Service's assertion that the owner was merely an "agent" for the
insured will be upheld in the event a court battle develops. While this
concern is justifiable for conditional gifts or for gifts of funds in
amounts exactly equal to the premium obligation, it is difficult to
assume that the Service will automatically be successful in its argument against this planning tool. If the insured makes an unconditional
gift of funds or property whose value is different from the premium
obligation, the exposure to inclusion of the policy proceeds is greatly
decreased.5 9 Of course, the unconditional nature of the gift may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case; a mutual understanding among the donor and donee to use the gift to pay insurance
premiums may necessitate inclusion of the proceeds. Proper counseling
by the estate planner, in addition to his explanation of the consequences of improper handling of insurance matters, should greatly
strengthen the taxpayer's chances of success.
IX.

ADDITIONAL PLANNING DEVICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Where it is desirable to keep life insurance proceeds out of the
insured's gross estate, the beneficiary should be the owner-applicant,
should pay all premiums with independent funds and should not be
influenced by the insured in the procurement of the policy. If the
owner-applicant has no substantial independent assets, the ownerapplicant can proceed in the manner outlined earlier in this article or
should seek to receive income-producing assets from the insured. The
problems involved, however, in these methods are often unavoidable;
the owner-applicant will not have sufficient independent funds or the
insured does not have an income-producing asset that can be transferred to the owner-applicant. While an estate planner will attempt to
59. There are sophisticated variations to these gifts which may withstand an IRS challenge.
The insured, prior to transferring a policy he owns, can irrevocably deposit three years of
premiums with the insurance company. Thereafter, he will make an annual deposit of an
additional year's premium. Each premium payment after the first three premiums would be paid
with funds given away at least three years earlier. Upon the insured's death, the only amount
included in his estate would arguably be the cash or deposit with the insurance company; this
amount would have been transferred within three years of the insured's death but would not have
purchased any insurance protection. The taxpayer's argument would be based upon a first-in,
first-out approach (FIFO); the government, of course, could argue for a last-in, first-out approach
(LIFO) to invoke a transfer within the three year period. Another weakness of this alternative is
the possible exposure to a section 2035 problem of the insured dying within the three year period
subsequent to the initial deposit. Instead of having the insured make the initial deposit for the
three years' premiums, the beneficiary could deposit this amount with the insurance company,
and the insured could make the subsequent annual payments. In this latter situation, the insured
has made no payment which would purchase insurance within three years after the transfer of the
policy. This method is, however, also susceptible to a LIFO argument. See also Abbin,
Significant Recent Developments Concerning Estate Planning (pt. 1), 5 TAX ADVISOR 68 (1974).
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structure his client's insurance affairs so that his estate plans are
susceptible to the minimum amount of risk if challenged by the Internal Revenue Service, the numerous uncertainties in this area of law
require legislative action.
If Congress decides to effectuate its announced goal of revising the
estate and gift tax code provisions, some definite guidelines should be
established for the treatment of life insurance in the contemplationof-death area. Specifically, congressional revision of the tax laws
should provide that:
(1) The only amount included in a decedent's gross estate in a
situation where another individual is the owner-applicant
of the policy and the insured-decedent pays the premiums
during the three-year period would be the amount of
insurance premiums paid during the contemplation-ofdeath period.
In essence, this provision would eliminate the premium-payment test
as an "incident of ownership" for purposes of a transfer under section
2035.
(2) There should be no distinction established for annual,
renewable policies where the renewed policy is similar in
form to the original policy. The effect of such a provision
would allow an insured to transfer an annual, renewable
policy at least three years prior to his death, but continue
to keep the policy in effect by making the premium payments.
Under this proposed revision, only the premiums paid by the insured
will be includable in his gross estate.
(3) Where the insured transfers a life insurance policy, which
was owned and applied for by the insured, within the
three years prior to his death, the normal contemplationof-death factors should be analyzed without any additional burdens caused by the nature of the asset.
The recent court decisions evince a changing attitude within the
judiciary regarding transfers of insurance policies in contemplationof-death. The continued application of the premium-payment test
along with the examination of the insured's control over the premium
payments as an "incident of ownership" capable of effecting a transfer
under section 2035 have been broadened to the extent that they now
encompass areas never before challenged by the Internal Revenue
Service. In light of the fact that a Supreme Court pronouncement will
probably be limited to a specific factual issue, congressional action is
imperative. Congress must now act to treat life insurance in a manner
similar to any other asset for purposes of gifts in contemplation-ofdeath.

